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This paper examines the structure of debt covenants in small firms, with emphasis on
privately owned firms. It is based on a survey of a large sample of firms drawn from the S&P
Register of Corporations. The findings show that debt covenants imposed on small firms differ
according to the firm type (privately owned or publicly owned), debt level, the borrowing cost,
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and the source of financing (bank or other sources). The evidence is generally consistent with
the arguments relating to stockholder-bondholder agency cost conflicts and the Costly
Contracting Hypothesis of Smith and Warner (1979).
I.

Introduction
Debt covenants are widely used in corporate debt issues, primarily as a means to
safeguard the interests of lenders. They form a foundation for the monitoring and control
relationship between creditors and borrowers. Properly structured debt covenants can mitigate
agency problems between stockholders and bondholders, and thus lower the firm‟s borrowing
costs. However, as Smith (1993) points out, covenants that are too restrictive can severely limit
the operating and financial activities of the borrowing firm. In their seminal paper, Smith and
Warner (1979) have provided a comprehensive analysis of the role of debt covenants in the
context of agency costs between stockholders and bondholders. They identify four major
sources of bondholder-stockholder conflicts – dividend payment, claim dilution, asset
substitution, and under-investment – and explain how debt covenants can be structured to
mitigate each of these potential problems. The first problem relates to excessive dividend
payments which can erode the firm‟s cash flows to the detriment of bondholders. In the
extreme case, as suggested by Black (1976), a company can easily escape the debt burden by
paying out all of its assets as a dividend thereby leaving creditors with an empty shell. The
second problem, claim dilution, would result from the issuance of additional debt that can
potentially dilute the claims of prior bondholders. The third problem, asset substitution, relates
to the possibility of the firm behavior in which riskier projects are undertaken subsequent to the
issuance of debt thereby reducing the value of existing debt claims on the firm. The fourth
problem, under-investment, can occur if the firm chooses not to undertake investment projects
with positive net present value if the benefit by doing so accrues to the firm‟s bondholders.
The Costly Contracting Hypothesis by Smith and Warner (1979) proposes that control
of bondholder-stockholder conflicts through financial contracts can increase the value of the
firm. It also argues that even though debt covenants are costly, the net benefit realized would
enable the firm value (and stockholder wealth) to be greater than without them. According to
Smith and Warner, bond covenants that are intended to lower the stockholder-bondholder
agency conflicts fall into these major categories: restrictions on dividend payments, restrictions
on the firm‟s production and investment policy, restrictions on subsequent financial policy,
covenants modifying the pattern of payoffs to bondholders, and covenants specifying bonding
activities by the firm. There have been several studies examining the debt covenants in relation
to agency costs in large, publicly owned corporations. Very little research has been done in
examining the use of debt covenants in loan contracts of small firms. This study makes an
attempt to fill the void.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of literature
on debt covenants and motivation for the study. Section III describes the data and methodology.
Section IV presents empirical evidence. Finally, Section V provides concluding remarks.
II.

Literature Review
A formal treatment of the role of debt covenants in the context of agency problems
between stockholders and bondholders was presented in the seminal work of Smith and Warner
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(1979) and their work formed a foundation for subsequent empirical research in the area.
Fama (1990) analyzes the lenders‟ incentives to monitor their borrowers and hypothesized that
debt seniority, covenants, and maturity structure are set to maximize the monitoring incentives
of the senior lender. Chen et al. (1995) analyze a situation in which banks make „bridge‟ loans
that are junior to publicly-issued long-term debt. According to their analysis, the bank imposes
safety covenants to protect its junior claims and also maintains a close surveillance of the
firm‟s activity. The senior bondholders benefit from the higher safety standards imposed by the
bank and also from the bank‟s monitoring. Further, if the bank sets too high a safety standard,
the firm‟s equity value may decline. As a result, the firm may choose to finance its capital
needs through the long-term debt market thereby increasing its maturity structure. Park (2000)
explores this issue further and addresses the questions as to why banks make short-term loans,
why their claims are senior to other claims, and why banks impose the most restrictive
covenants on borrowing firms. His analysis shows that junior lenders do not monitor and senior
debt is best held by financial intermediaries with the lowest monitoring costs. In order to
maximize the monitoring incentives of the senior lender, the senior claim will have the most
restrictive covenants and the shortest possible maturity.
Day and Taylor (1998) argue that debt covenants play a wider role in corporate
governance for controlling relationships between lenders and firms and discuss the need for
standardization of debt contracts. Any violation of debt covenants results in a technical default
and, according to the findings in Beneish and Press (1995) and Fargher, Wilkins, and HolderWebb (2001), such violations are associated with increases in the firm‟s risk (systematic and
unsystematic) and a decline in stock prices. According to research by Mohrman (1989),
Beneish and Press (1993), and Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1995) debt covenants that are most
commonly imposed on the borrowing firm relate to its profitability, liquidity, and leverage, and
violating them happens to be associated with the most technical defaults. Using Dealscan
database from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that the three
most frequently imposed debt covenants are the ratios of debt to cash flow, interest coverage,
and fixed charge coverage. From a survey of senior bankers, Cotter (1998) finds that the most
commonly used covenants in Australia are leverage, interest coverage, current ratio, and prior
charges ratio. Day and Taylor (1997) interviewed bank loan officers in UK and found that
majority of them saw debt covenants as a means to provide early warning signals of potential
problems at the borrower firms and, in the event of deteriorating financial conditions,
covenants turn out to be powerful levers to renegotiate the terms with the borrowers. They also
found that dividend restrictions are rarely stipulated in bank loan covenants in UK, probably to
avoid being a “shadow director” of the companies to which they lend. This evidence contrasts
the finding of Healy and Palepu (1990) for US firms which commonly encounter dividend
restrictions in their debt contracts.
Studies by Iskandar-Datta and Emery (1994) have found a trade-off between restrictive
covenants and interest costs of debt. Their findings also showed an association between
indenture provisions and credit ratings indicating that rating agencies may use the information
in indentures in their evaluation process. An analysis of L.A. Gear‟s case by DeAngelo,
DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002) suggests that debt covenants can be a stronger disciplinary
mechanism than the contractual requirement of making periodic interest payments on debt. The
L.A. Gear case also shows that short-term debt enables frequent oversight and renegotiation of
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credit agreements by lenders thereby limiting the ability of mangers to use liquid assets for
circumventing the disciplinary pressures of debt. According to a study by Berger and Udell
(1990), provisions relating to collateral requirements are associated with higher credit risk to
lenders, i.e., the loan contracts of riskier borrowers had collateral provisions.
Ramsay and Sidhu (1998) examine private debt (bank) agreements of a small sample of
16 contracts. They find prevalence of „tailored‟ accounting based constraints as well as nonaccounting based restrictions on firms‟ production and investment policies. Debt covenants also
included financing, bonding, and reporting activities of the borrowing firms. The analysis
presented in Pashley, Krishnaswamy, and Gilbert (1997) shows that debt covenants restricting
the sale of depreciable assets may be positively associated with the amount of debt used by the
firm and, as a result, the firm‟s compliance costs would be higher. Begley and Feltham (1999)
examined the relationship between debt covenants (restrictions on dividends and additional
borrowing) and management incentives. They hypothesized that a large cash compensation to
CEO aligns CEO‟s interests with debt holders and large equity holdings align CEO‟s interests
with equity holders. Using a sample of 91 senior debt issues by industrial firms, they find that
covenants have a significant negative relation to CEO cash compensation and an insignificant
relation to the CEO‟s equity holdings.
With respect to debt covenants relating to restrictions on dividend payments, John and
Kalay (1982) show that debt covenants minimizing deividend payments are necessary to
prevent potential wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders. However, Kalay (1982)
notes that the actual dividend payment levels are below the maximum levels allowed by the
constraints which suggests that dividend related covenants may be superfluous. Consistent with
this notion, Frankfuter and Wood (2002) argue, “although substantial in preceipitation of
agency costs, its (sic) dividend policy is not a major source of bondholder wealth
expropriation.”
While the above studies addressed various issues relating to debt covenants, none of
them have examined issues relating to debt covenants in small firms, especially privatelyowned businesses. Our study fills the gap and sheds light on various aspects of debt covenants
in small firms, and the motivation for the study stems from the fact that large-public firms and
small-private firms differ structurally in several ways. First, in small firms the control of the
firm‟s primarily rests in the hands of major owners who also happen to be the top managers.
Outside equity owners, if any, tend to hold minority stakes and possess little control over the
managerial behavior. Additionally, illiquidity of stock ownership, small number of investors,
and information limitations tend to be more severe in private firms. Lack of discipline from
stock market and takeover mechanism further exacerbate the agency problems in small firms.
The boards of small firms are typically dominated by managers themselves, major stockholders
and their family members and are susceptible to a lack of discipline or monitoring from
outsiders. In contrast to the empirical evidence on large firms, for example Bathala and Rao
(1995) who have found that outside directors on the board play an important role in mitigating
agency conflicts between management and shareholders, Mace (1948) observes that board
members of small firms do not play a major role in the formulation of higher level strategies or
monitoring of top management.
In regard to information availability, public firms are required to file extensive
information and periodic statements to the SEC and security exchanges which is not the case
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with private firms. Often, the small firms‟ financial statements are not even audited and they
need not prepare quarterly statements. Analyst following and institutional investors serve as
information gatherers as well as monitors of managerial behavior. These mechanisms are not
available for private firms.
With respect of debt finance, large-public firms tend to rely more heavily on publicly
issued debt and the trustee for the bond issue, bond rating agencies, and investor trading
activities provide the much needed monitoring functions. In case of small-private firms, the
debt capital is primarily from bank finance, loans from family and friends, and accounts
payable. Therefore, the monitoring is primarily by lenders themselves and credit bureaus for
credit ratings. The potential default risk also varies between publicly-owned and privatelyowned firms because publicly-owned firms tend to have larger management teams, professional
managers, larger asset base, and a greater potential to tide over the ups and downs of economic
fortunes.
Owing to these major differences between public and private firms, we expect a great
deal of divergence in debt covenants between the two groups. For example, there need not be a
debt covenant for furnishing audited financial statements if it were a publicly-owned firm but it
could be important for a privately-owned firm. Seeking guarantees from owner-managers and
collateral for loans may be prominent among the debt covenants of private firms compared to
public firms. Specifically, our research will provide answers to the following questions: (1)
Which debt covenants are widely used in small firms? (2) Are there any differences in debt
covenants in privately-owned and publicly-owned firms? (3) What are the major influencing
factors of debt covenants in privately-owned firms? and (4) Can issues relating to agency costs
and information asymmetry explain the differences in debt covenants among small firms?
III.

Data and Methodology
The data for this research were gathered using a survey instrument. The Standard &
Poor‟s 1997 Directory of Corporations (Vol.1) is the source of names and addresses of the
corporations surveyed in this research. The S&P Directory includes corporations (public and
private), non-profit firms, charitable institutions, and trusts. From each page of the S&P
Directory we chose the first firm in the first column. Next, we removed from the list all types of
entities other than private and public corporations from the list (charities, universities, nonprofit hospitals, etc.). This procedure resulted in a sample of 2,870 companies – 2,251 private
firms (78.4 percent) and 619 public firms (21.6 percent). The survey was anonymous and the
questionnaire was not marked in order to ensure anonymity of responding firms. The survey
instrument was four pages long and it sought information on ownership/governance issues,
shareholder agreements, sale/transfer of ownership, and financial policies.
The survey questionnaires were mailed in the month of August, 1998. A total of 275
firms provided responses for a response rate of 9.6%. An additional 75 envelopes were returned
to us as undeliverable. Of the responses received 251 were usable. The response rate, although
somewhat low, looks typical of surveys involving small firms. The President or CEO of the
company provided as much as 74.5% of the responses, but the proportion of responses provided
by them is higher for publicly owned firms (78%) than for privately owned firms (61%).
However, from the comparisons presented below, we note that the responding firms are
representative of the firms in the population. Further, the final sample size is large enough for
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the purpose of the statistical methods (parametric and non-parametric) employed in the paper
and making inferences about the data.
Out of the total of 251 responses, 201 (80.1%) are from privately-owned companies and
50 (19.9%) are from publicly-owned companies. This distribution is very close to the
distribution of firms in the mailing list (2,870 companies) --- 2,251 private firms (78.4%) and
619 public firms (21.6%). The distribution of sample firms according to their business
background is as follows: 130 firms (52%) are in manufacturing sector; 26 firms (10.4%) are in
trading sector (wholesale and retail); 25 firms (10%) in agriculture, construction and mining,
and 19 firms (7.6%) in service sector. The distribution of sample firms according to sales are as
follows: 153 firms (61.7%) have sales revenues of $25 million or less. Of this, 139 are private
firms (90.8%) and 14 (9.2%) are public firms. We find 17 firms (6.8%) with sales over $500
million, of which 3 are private firms (17.6%) and 14 (82.4%) are public. The major difference
between the distributions of private and public firms is that a greater proportion of public firms
are larger in size than private firms. In terms of company size measured as the number of
employees, a total of 138 firms (55%) have 100 or fewer employees. However, 125 of those
firms are private (90.6%) whereas only 13 firms (9.4%) are public. At the other extreme, in the
category of firms with employees of 500 or more, there are a total of 41 firms (16.3% of total
respondents) of which 13 firms (31.7%) are private and 28 firms (68.3%) are public. Overall,
sales and number of employees seem to correlate highly.
The data gathered from our survey are in different forms: (a) use of a Lichert scale (for
example, 1 = Least important; ---- 5 = Most important), (b) by a range of values (for example, 1
= Zero% debt ratio; ----- 6 = Debt ratio over 75%), (c) identification by a classification scheme
(for example, 1 = Short-term debt; 2 = Medium-term debt, and 3 = Long-term debt), and (d)
continuous measurement (for example, the CEO‟s length of experience at the firm). The
classifications or rankings were appropriately used to capture the differences according to the
needs of statistical approaches used in the study. The survey instrument was comprehensive
and the questionnaire covered various topic areas, ownership and governance, CEO
characteristics, financial policies (debt, dividends, and lease financing), and incentive/control
mechanisms in firms. In this paper, we use survey responses that are relevant for examining the
issues relating to debt covenants.
In the section about debt financing, we sought information about debt covenants.
Specifically, the sample firms were asked to indicate the loan requirements and restrictive
covenants relating to bank loans and loans from other sources. The loan
requirements/covenants included in the questionnaire were intended to analyze the structure of
debt covenants in small firms from the agency costs perspective of Smith and Warner (1979)
and the questions sought information relating to both positive and negative covenants. The
positive covenants are: (1) reporting covenants (furnishing financial statements and statements
of accounts receivable and inventory), (2) bonding covenants (personal guarantees, requirement
of life insurance policies of key personnel, and collateral requirements), and (3) ownership and
control covenants (seeking stock ownership or representation on the company‟s board). The
negative or restrictive covenants pertain to (1) restrictions on dividend payments (maximum
payout ratio), (2) restrictions on salary/other compensation to officers and directors (to contain
potential wealth expropriation by managers), (3) restrictions relating to maximum debt ratio
and minimum liquidity (to control financial risk), and (4) restrictions on types on investments
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or capital expenditures (to control the risk shifting behavior). A priori, we form the following
hypotheses:

H-1:
H-2:
H-3:
H-4:

Bank loans entail more covenants than loans from other sources.
Privately-owned and publicly-owned firms differ in the debt covenants imposed on
them.
Within the privately-owned firms, debt covenants differ by (a) ownership and (b) firm
size differences.
Within the privately-owned firms, debt covenants would be positively related to (a) debt
leverage, (b) debt cost, and (c) debt collateral.

Our first hypothesis (H-1) follows Chen, et al. (1995) and Park (2000) who showed that
banks tend to be the active monitors of loans and they tend to be more stringent in imposing
covenants to safeguard their claims against the firm. Our other hypotheses (H-2, H-3, and H-4))
are based on the potential differences in informational asymmetry and agency problems
between firms that differ in ownership structure and firm size. The hypothesis H-2 is based on
several differences between publicly-owned and privately-owned firms with respect to agency
problems, informational asymmetry, and potential bankruptcy costs that were enumerated in
the prior section of the paper.
Hypotheses H-3 and H-4 are examined for the debt covenant differences within the
privately-owned group. H-3 proposes that debt covenants differ by differences in (a) ownership
and (b) firm size. We argue that family owned firms, compared to closely/widely owned firms
are likely to be subject to more debt covenants for such reasons as greater credit risks and
information limitations. For similar reasons, smaller firms are likely to be subject to more debt
covenants. H-4 proposes that debt covenants would be positively associated with (a) debt
leverage, (b) cost of debt, and (c) debt collateral. The hypothesis H-4a is intuitive in that the
greater the debt leverage the higher the potential bankruptcy risk and thus more debt covenants.
Hypotheses H-4b and H-4c, on the other hand, assume that lenders assuming higher risks
would not only require higher rates of return on their loans but also attach more debt covenants.
Thus, the cost of debt and debt covenants would be positively related. In a similar vein, one can
argue that that if lenders assume greater risks they are more likely to require collateral and also
impose more debt covenants on those loans.
For empirical analysis, we use Chi-Squared tests and a multiple regression model. The
Chi-Squared tests, in univariate setting, enable us to test the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between the set of observed cell frequencies and the set of expected cell frequencies
in a two-way classification scheme. Our emphasis is on privately-owned firms and therefore,
we decompose the analyses further according to ownership differences (family-owned vs.
closely- or widely-owned), firm size, and the use of debt leverage. The number of survey
responses and the cell sizes are sufficiently large to make such comparisons among private
firms using the Chi-Squared approach. Further, more general comparisons with publicly-owned
firms are made using the data from the same survey. In our second approach, multiple
regression analysis, we examine cross-sectional variations in debt covenants by estimating a
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regression equation with a scaled measure of debt covenants as the dependent variable and a set
of explanatory variables reflecting dimensions such as debt structure, inside ownership, CEO
experience, dividend payout, age of the company, and the firm type (private or public).
While the two empirical approaches employed in the paper are appropriate for the data
at hand and the inferences we intend to make, two potential need to be pointed out up-front.
First, in Chi_Squared analysis, some frequency tables have expected cell sizes smaller than five
but such instances were just a few. Second, in multiple regression analysis, many variables are
discrete (for example, responses received on a Lichert scale or using a classification scheme to
distinguish the variable of interest by multiple levels). But, from the degree of variation
afforded by the classification scheme that we have used, the large number of observations for
the regression, and the model‟s explanatory power, we are confident about the results.
IV.

Empirical Evidence
As debt covenants do not apply to those firms which do not use borrowed funds in their
capital, we exclude such firms from our analysis of debt covenants. This resulted in a sample of
147 private firms and 39 public firms which employed debt in their capital structure. In this we
discuss our findings from the Chi-Squared method and a multiple regression model. In ChiSquare analysis, we examine the differences in debt covenants and loan requirements according
to loan type, ownership structure, firm size, debt features, and other firm characteristics. The
univariate analysis with Chi-Squared tests enables us to identify the characteristics of firms that
differentiate them with respect to the various debt covenants. However, they did not allow us to
examine the partial effects of the various influencing factors of debt covenants while
controlling for other variables. A multiple regression analysis is a useful technique to overcome
this limitation as it enables us to regress the dependent variable on a set of explanatory
variables. Using a multiple regression model, we would examine the relationship between the
number of debt covenants on a firm and a set of debt related agency and bankruptcy costs, asset
substitution, underinvestment, and risk shifting. Our expectation is that the firms with higher
agency and bankruptcy costs will have a larger number of debt covenants.
Univariate Analysis
In univariate analysis we examine the frequency distribution of various debt covenants
by different firm characteristics: (A) Bank loans versus other loans, (B) Ownership and firm
size differences, and (C) Differences in debt features. For statistical testing, we use the ChiSquare approach and verify the null hypothesis that the expected and observed cell sizes are not
significantly different from each other.
a.
Bank Loans versus Other Loans
In Table I we examine the differences in covenants between bank loans and loans from
other loans for privately-owned firms and publicly-owned firms. First, we examine debt
covenants imposed in bank loans to firms. The three most widely used covenants in bank loans
to privately-owned firms relate to (1) furnishing financial statements (95.2% of firms), (2)
collateral of property and equipment (62.6% of firms), and (3) personal guarantees from major
stockholders, officers, or directors (53.1% of firms). In case of publicly-owned companies, the
three most widely used covenants in bank loans are (1) furnishing financial statements (87.2%
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of firms), (2) restrictions on maximum debt level (41.0% of firms), and (3) requiring minimum
level of liquidity (41.0% of firms).
According to the Chi-Squared test statistics, private and public firms differ from each
other (at a 10% level of statistical significance or better) with respect to debt covenants relating
to furnishing of financial statements (p-value = 0.069), personal guarantees from major
stockholders, officers, or directors (p-value < 0.0001), collateral of property and equipment (pvalue = 0.0004), restrictions on maximum dividend payments (p-value = 0.004), restrictions on
maximum debt level (p-value = 0.019), and requirement of minimum liquidity (p-value =
0.094). In the case of private firms, banks‟ covenants geared more toward reporting and
bonding requirements seem to be driven by informational asymmetry and security
considerations. Compared to this, banks seem to be more concerned about excessive dividend
payments and financial risk considerations in imposing covenants on loans to publicly-owned
firms.
Next, we compare debt covenants between bank loans and loans from other sources. In
general, firms are subject to far fewer debt covenants when they borrow from sources other
than banks. This finding is consistent with our a priori expectations and with the analysis in
Chen, et al. (1995) and Park (2000). For private firms the three most widely used covenants in
loans from other sources are the same as in the case of bank loans. In case of public firms, the
three most popular debt covenants in loans from other sources are furnishing of financial
statements, collateral of property and equipment, and restrictions on dividend payments.
In view of the small number of publicly-owned firms (n=39), it would be difficult to
make any further rigorous analysis of debt covenants in those firms. Therefore, we concentrate
on privately-owned firms for a more detailed analysis debt covenants. Lenders other than banks
are not a homogeneous group and, as noted in Table I, loans from those sources do not contain
many debt covenants. For these reasons, our further analysis will focus on debt covenants in
bank loans to privately-owned firms.
b.
Ownership and Firm Size Differences
In Table II we examine the differences in frequency distributions of covenants in bank
loans to private firms. The analysis is conducted by separating the firms according to
ownership structure (family owned, n = 98; closely or widely owned, n = 50) and firm size
(sales <= $25 million, n = 103; sales > $25 million, n = 45). For the most part, ownership or
firm size differences do not seem to matter in the imposition of loan covenants by banks. The
statistically significant differences as noted on the basis of Chi-Squared statistics relate only to
the firm size differences with respect to the following two covenants. As high as 60.2% of
smaller private firms (sales <= $25 m) are subject to covenants requiring personal guarantees
from major stockholders, officers, or directors as opposed to only 35.6% of larger private firms
(sales > $25 m). The Chi-Squared statistic of 7.627 is statistically significant with a p-value of
0.006. About 40% of larger private firms (sales > $25 m) reported have covenants relating to
minimum level of liquidity compared to 21.4% of smaller private firms (sales <= $25 m)
having such covenants. The Chi-Squared statistic of 5.513 is statistically significant with a pvalue of 0.019.
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c.
Differences by Debt Features
We now turn our attention to three different debt characteristics (debt level, borrowing,
and collateral for debt) which are likely to have a strong bearing on debt covenants. A firm‟s
financial risk and its potential for bankruptcy would increase as the firm increases its debt
leverage. As a consequence, lenders are likely to impose more debt covenants on firms with
higher debt use. Therefore, we expect debt covenants to be a positive function of debt leverage
used by firms. Bank lending to firms are typically linked to the prime rate and the lending rate
would primarily depend upon the bank‟s risk exposure in the loan. In addition to increasing the
lending rate to high risk borrowers, banks are likely to impose more debt covenants on them. If
this assumption holds, we can expect a positive association between the firm‟s borrowing cost
and debt covenants. If a bank loan is secured (for example, by accounts receivable or
inventory), then the bank‟s risk exposure diminishes relative to lending on unsecured basis. If
so, firms with majority of bank loans in the secured form are likely to be subject to fewer debt
covenants. Alternatively, if banks require security on the assumption of higher risks associated
with the loan, then they may impose more covenants in addition to lending on secured basis. If
this assumption holds, we would see a positive association between secured loans and debt
covenants.
First, we examine the relationship between debt leverage and debt covenants.
Specifically, we examine this relationship by dividing the responding firms into three groups
according to their debt levels (Low debt firms: 1-10% debt ratio, n = 42; Medium debt firms:
11-25% debt ratio, n = 41; and High debt firms: >25% debt ratio, n = 59). As discussed
previously, we anticipate an increase in the proportion of firms subject to a given covenant as
the debt ratio increases from low to high.
The frequency distributions of firms in different debt levels and the covenants to which
they are subject are presented in Table III. The Chi-Squared tests are conducted to verify if
there are significant differences between the expected and observed cell counts. From the data
in Table III, we can first notice that the proportion of firms that are subject to any given
covenant increases with the level of debt providing a general confirmation to our hypothesis,
H-4. The statistically significant differences, however, relate to covenants involving bonding
and collateral requirements, maximum debt levels, minimum liquidity levels, and the type of
investments. The Chi-Squared statistics and p-values relating to the expected versus observed
frequency distributions of those covenants have statistical significance at the 5% level or better.
This evidence clearly points out that banks are concerned with the increasing potential for risks
of bankruptcy and asset substitution as the firms they lend to become increasingly levered.
Second, we examine the relationship between the cost of bank loans and bank loan
covenants in private firms. For this purpose, we classify borrowing costs into two categories –
borrowing at or below the prime rate (n = 85) and borrowing above the prime rate (n = 64). The
data and the Chi-Squared test statistics are presented in Table IV. As can be seen, in every debt
covenant the proportion of firms whose borrowing cost is above the prime rate is larger than the
proportion of firms whose borrowing cost is below the prime rate and the difference is
statistically significant for 7 out of 12 covenants. This evidence supports our contention of a
positive linkage between the loan covenants and the borrowing cost, a relationship that is
implied in Smith and Warner‟s Costly Contracting Hypothesis.
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Third, we examine the relationship between debt security and debt covenants. In the
survey questionnaire, we asked firms to indicate if the majority of debt used by them is
unsecured or secured. Table IV contains the frequency distributions of debt covenants in firms
that differ in debt security: majority of debt being on secured or unsecured basis. As can be
seen, in every debt covenant a larger percentage of firms in the secured debt category are
subject to the covenant in question relative to the firms in the unsecured debt category. The
Chi-Squared tests suggest that the two groups differ in the imposition of loan covenants upon
them, with the exception of the covenants relating to furnishing of financial statements, life
insurance of key personnel, and limits on executive salary/compensation. This evidence seems
to support the contention that banks not only require security for their loans when their lending
risks are high but also impose more covenants on such firms. Conversely, low risk firms seem
to receive bank loans on an unsecured basis and are subject to fewer covenants at the same
time.
Regression Analysis
The univariate analyses and Chi-Square tests in the previous section have provided
insights into the differences in debt covenants by different firm characteristics. Since univariate
approaches do not allow us to control for other influencing factors, we conduct multivariate
analysis by employing a multiple regression model with a measure of debt covenants as the
dependent variable. Through regression analysis we can examine the cross-sectional variations
in debt covenants using multiple dimensions of explanatory variables reflecting ownership
differences, debt characteristics, dividend payout, company size, age, and the firm‟s class
(private or public).
a.
Description of the Regression Model
The dependent variable in our regression model is BANKCOV, the sum of different
bank covenants imposed on the firm. We assume that the total number of different covenants
imposed on a firm is a function of various influencing factors such as debt related agency and
bankruptcy costs, asset substitution, underinvestment, and risk shifting that are enumerated in
Smith and Warner (1979). Specifically, we use the sum of the affirmative responses to survey
questions relating to the existence or otherwise of the following covenants: (1) Furnishing
financial statements, (2) Periodic statements of accounts receivable and inventory, (3) Personal
guarantees from major stockholders, officers, or directors of the firm, (4) Collateral of property
and/or equipment, (5) Life insurance covering the key personnel or major stockholders of the
firm, (6) Requiring representation on the company‟s board of directors,(7) Seeking equity
ownership in the firm, (8) Maximum dividend payout ratio, (9) Maximum salary/other
compensation to the company‟s officers and directors, (10) Maximum debt level, (11)
Minimum level of liquidity, and (12) Types of investments or capital expenditures that the
company can make. As in the univariate analysis, we have excluded firms that responded
indicating no debt financing in their capital. The explanatory variables are those that are
conceptually and empirically important from the standpoint of debt covenants imposed on the
firm. We specify the following multiple regression equation. The measurement of variables is
described in Table V.
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BANKCOV = f (DEBTRAT DEBTMAT DEBTCOLL DEBTCOST TRCREDIT
INSOWN CEOEXP PAYOUT COMPAGE SIZE FIRMTYPE)

Our first explanatory variable in the regression is DEBTRAT, the debt ratio with
numerical values ranging from 2 to 6. The value of 2 is assigned to the responses that checked
the debt ratio in the range of 1-10% and the value of 6 is assigned to the responses indicating
the debt ratio over 75%. The numerical value of 1 is excluded as it was assigned for responses
indicating no debt usage. We expect a positive relationship between DEBTRAT and
BANKCOV. The DEBTMAT variable indicates the maturity structure of majority of the firm‟s
debt. The maturity differences are captured by numerical values, 1 = short-term, 2 = mediumterm, and 3 = long-term. Typically, long-term debt is riskier from lender‟s standpoint and they
may impose more covenants for assuming higher risks in lending for long term. On the other
hand, banks typically lend for short term and they tend to impose more covenants on borrowers
than other lenders. As a result, it is hard to make an a priori determination of the sign for the
parameter estimate of DEBTMAT. SECDEBT indicates if majority of the firm‟s debt is
unsecured (value = 1) or secured (value = 1). As discussed previously, secured debt may be
associated with fewer or more debt covenants. As such, the sign for the coefficient of
SECDEBT is indeterminate.
The borrowing cost of debt, DEBTCOST, is measured on a numerical scale of 1 to 5 (1
= borrowing cost below the prime rate.....5 = borrowing cost more than 5% over the prime
rate). The larger the number the higher the borrowing cost. As riskier firms tend to have higher
borrowing costs, it would be reasonable to assume that such firms are also subject to more debt
covenants. Therefore, we hypothesize positive coefficient for the DEBTCOST variable. Trade
credit (TRCREDIT) is a major source of financing for small firms. This variable is measured
on a Lichert scale with values ranging from 1 to 5 indicating the importance of trade credit as a
source of financing (1 = least important……5 = most important). It is likely that banks may
view firms with heavy reliance on trade credit as riskier because high trade credit balances may
induce a potential dilution of the their own claims against the firm. In order to increase the
safety of their loans banks may impose more debt covenants on such firms. Therefore, we
expect a positive sign for the coefficient of TRCREDIT.
INSOWN and CEOEXP are intended to capture the managerial incentive effects that
may impact the risk perception banks for lending as well as determination of debt covenants.
INOWN is a measure of insider ownership of common stock, the percentage of firm‟s stock
owned by its officers and directors. It is measured on a numerical scale with the value of 1
indicating no insider ownership and the value of 5 for insider ownership greater than 75%. A
high insider stock ownership may lead to increased agency costs between stockholders and
bondholders especially those associated with underinvestment and risk shifting. As such,
INSOWN is likely to have a positive association with BANKCOV. The CEOEXP is measured
as the number of years of CEO‟s experience in that position with the firm. The CEOs with
longer tenures indicate stability of leadership at the firm level and such CEOs are also likely to
have long-standing relationships with lenders, especially banks. These positive aspects may
reduce lending risks and banks may choose to impose fewer debt covenants of the firm. This
possibility suggests a negative association between CEOEXP and BANKCOV.
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The potential for excessive dividend payments is a major source of agency conflicts
between stockholders and bondholders. In order to prevent this potential agency problem,
bondholders are likely to impose more debt covenants on the firm in addition to a restrictive
covenant on dividend payments. If this argument holds, we would find a positive relationship
between the firm‟s dividend payout ratio (PAYOUT) and its debt covenants (BANKCOV).
This PAYOUT variable is measured on a numerical scale of 1 to 6….the value of 1 with
responses for zero payout ratio and 6 with responses for payout ratio greater than 75%.
The next explanatory variable, COMPAGE, is the company‟s age measured as the
number of years of its operation. A firm‟s longevity is indicative of its stability and its potential
to weather the ups and downs in economic conditions. Firms in existence for longer time
periods are also more likely to have long-term on-going relationships with their bankers. As a
result, banks may view such firms to be less risky and impose fewer covenants on them. If this
expectation holds, we may find a negative relationship between COMPAGE and BANKCOV.
Firm size (SIZE) is measured as on a numerical scale using company sales: 1 = $50 m or less;
2 = $51-100 m; 3 = $101 - $500 m; 4 = $500 m - $1 b; 5 = > 1 b. The last variable,
FIRMTYPE, is a 0-1 dummy variable. It takes the value equals 1 if the firm is publicly-owned
and 0 if the firm is privately-owned. Firms that are privately owned are prone to potentially
greater problems of information asymmetry and bankruptcy risk than publicly owned firms. On
the other hand, publicly owned firms are more far more likely to have stockholder-bondholder
agency conflicts than privately owned firms. Given this dichotomy, it is difficult to make an
unambiguous prediction for the sign of FIRMTYPE variable.
b.
Discussion of Regression Results
The regression results are presented in Table V. In all, 148 firms had responses for all
the variables in the regression equation. The estimated equation has an adjusted R-Square of
0.2407, which is quite reasonable considering the cross-sectional nature of the study. The
Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) of all explanatory variables are less than 2 which enable us to
infer that there is no multicollinearity problem causing confounding of parameter estimates.
The coefficients for DEBTRAT, DEBTCOST, and TRCREDIT variables are
statistically significant with positive signs as expected. These findings are supportive of our
priors that the greater the risks to the lender the more the debt covenants.
The parameter estimate of the CEOEXP variable is also statistically significant but its
positive sign is the opposite of our expectation of a negative sign. While this evidence is
somewhat surprising, it is plausible that banks may be viewing the CEO‟s tenure with the firm
as a factor for potential entrenchment problems as well as higher stockholder-debt holder
related agency conflict. This is a conjecture that seems to explain the positive association
between CEOEXP and BANKCOV. The only other variable that has a statistically significant
relationship to BANKCOV is FIRMTYPE which has a positive coefficient. This evidence
supports the argument that stockholder-debt holder conflicts are likely to be more in publicly
owned firms and as a consequence they encounter more debt covenants than privately owned
firms. We ran two regression models, without SIZE (Model 1) and with SIZE (Model 2)
specifically to assess the partial effect of firm size on debt covenants. With the addition of
SIZE the adjusted R-Square improved to 0.2691, but the parameter estimate for SIZE is not
statistically significant. However, the variable for secured debt (SECDEBT) that had a positive
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but statistically insignificant coefficient has now turned statistically significant at the 10 percent
level.
Next, we modified the dependent variable such that its measurement includes only those
covenants that are more directly linked to Smith and Warner‟s costly contracting arguments.
We denote the new dependent variable as BANKCOV1, which is the sum of affirmative
responses for the following six debt covenants: (3) Personal guarantees from major
stockholders, officers, or directors of the firm, (4) Collateral of property and/or equipment, (8)
Maximum dividend payout ratio, (10) Maximum debt level, (11) Minimum level of liquidity,
and (12) Types of investments or capital expenditures that the company can make. The results
from this regression model (Model 3) are presented in Table V. This model has an adjusted RSquare of 0.2115 (versus 0.2691 for Model 2), indicating loss of some explanatory power
owing to fewer number of covenants included in the measurement of the dependent variable.
Further, the results are essentially the same except for slight changes in the statistical
significance of some of the explanatory variables.
c.
Loan Covenants and Cost of Debt: Further Analysis
Both univariate and regression analyses revealed evidence of a positive association
between the cost of debt and loan covenants, a result that is consistent with Smith and Warner‟s
Costly Contracting Hypothesis which implies that loan covenants should be priced in the
market. However, one reviewer suggested that we can do a more direct test of the observed
relationship between the two by regressing the cost of debt on various loan covenants and firm
characteristics. Following by the reviewer‟s suggestion, we regressed the cost of debt
(DEBTCOST: 1 = Below Prime Rate; 2 = At Prime Rate; 3 = Up to 2% over Prime Rate;
4 = Between 2.1 and 5% over Prime Rate; 5 = More than 5% over Prime Rate) on loan
covenants variables (two separate regressions for BANKCOV and BANKCOV1) and firm
characteristics as in the previous regressions. The findings show that the loan covenants
variable, measured as either BANKCOV or BANKCOV1, is positively related to the cost of
debt with the coefficient for BANKCOV significant at the one percent level and the coefficient
for BANKCOV1 significant at the five percent level. In both regressions the SIZE variable has
a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the one percent level. None of the other
variables have coefficients that are statistically significant. Therefore, for the sake of brevity
results from these regressions are not reported in a separate table.
V.

Concluding Remarks
Our study of an examination of debt covenants in small firms is based on a survey of a
large sample of firms drawn from the S&P Directory of Corporations. The responses received
from the firms participating in the survey formed the data base for the empirical analysis in the
study. For data analysis we have used Chi-Squared tests and a multiple regression analyis.
The study has provided interesting insights into the debt covenants in small firms and
the findings are unique in many ways. First, no other study known to us has made a
comprehensive examination of debt covenants in small firms, especially privately owned firms.
Second, in addition to providing a comparison of debt covenants between privately-owned and
publicly-owned firms, the study explains the differences in debt covenants in privately-owned
firms on the basis of firm characteristics relating to ownership and debt leverage.
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The major findings from the study are as follows. First, debt covenants imposed on
most small firms relate to bank loans than loans from other sources. Second, a larger proportion
of private firms compared to public firms are subject to positive covenants or loan requirements
that are of reporting and bonding nature (e.g., furnishing financial statements, offering
guarantees, collateral, or life insurance policies to secure loans. A higher percentage of public
firms, on the other hand, are subject to covenants primarily relating to excessive dividend
payments, excessive use of debt, restrictions on the type of investments or capital expenditures;
perhaps, to prevent asset substitution, and maintenance of minimum liquidity. The restrictive
covenants relating to dividends could be because the average size of these public firms is
larger, indicating they are more mature firms. More mature firms tend to pay higher dividends.
Thus excessive dividend can become more of a problem. Less established smaller firms tend to
be short of cash, hence having less incentive to pay dividend. Second, public firms are known
to have shareholders. Third, among private firms, we do not find significant differences in most
of the covenants imposed by banks on the basis of differences in ownership (family owned or
closely/widely owned) or firm size. Fourth, among private firms, the proportion of firms
subject to bank loan covenants increases with the debt level, the cost of borrowing, and if the
debt is on secured basis. In general, the findings from regression analysis are consistent with
the findings from the Chi-Squared tests, and it strengthens our findings by controlling for the
various factors that have a bearing on debt covenants. Overall, the findings are consistent with
the arguments relating to agency cost conflicts between stockholders and bondholders. More
importantly, the sustained positive relationship between loan covenants and the cost of debt
observed in both univariate and multiple regression analysis supports the implication of Smith
and Warner‟s Costly Contracting Hypothesis that loan covenants should be priced in the
market.
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Table I
Loan Requirements and Restrictive Covenants – Private vs. Public Firms
Question: Banks and creditors typically require protection for their loans in several ways. Please indicate (with “X”) the
conditions/restrictions relating to bank loans and loans from other sources that the firm has utilized.
Cell values are the Number (Percentage)
of firms within the respective class
(Private or Public) indicating the
existence of the covenant in question.

Bank Loans

Other Loans

Private
Firms
(n=147)

Public
Firms
(n=39)

Chi-Sq.
(p-val.)

Private
Firms
(n=147)

Public
Firms
(n=39)

Chi-Sq.
(p-val.)

Furnishing financial statements: inc.
statement, bal. sheet, and cash flows.

140
(95.2)

34
(87.2)

3.316
(0.069)

18
(12.2)

12 (30.8)

7.819
(0.005)

Periodic statements of accounts
receivable and inventory.

58
(39.5)

13
(33.3)

0.489
(0.484)

8
(5.5)

2
(5.1)

0.007
(0.931)@

Personal guarantees from major
stockholders, officers, or directors.

78
(53.1)

6
(15.4)

17.667
(< .0001)

12
(8.1)

0
(0.0)

3.403
(0.065)

Collateral of property and/or equipment.

92
(62.6)

12
(30.8)

12.657
(0.0004)

16 (10.9)

6
(15.4)

0.599
(0.439)

Life insurance covering the firm’s key
personnel or major stockholders.

31
(21.1)

5
(12.8)

1.350
(0.245)

8
(5.5)

1
(2.6)

0.565
(0.452)@

Requiring representation on the
company’s board of directors.

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N/A

1
(0.7)

2
(5.3)

3.975
(0.046)@

Seeking equity ownership in the firm.

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N/A

2 (1.4)

2 (5.1)

2.079
(0.149)

Maximum dividend payments (e.g., max.
payout ratio) to stockholders.

20
(13.6)

13
(33.3)

8.220
(0.004)

2
(1.4)

6
(15.4)

14.728
(0.0001)@

Max. salary/other compensation to the
company’s officers & directors..

9
(6.1)

1
(2.6)

0.767
(0.381)@

6
(4.1)

0
(0.0)

1.645
(0.200)@

Max. debt level (e.g., maximum debt level
as a percentage of total capital).

33
(22.4)

16
(41.0)

5.482
(0.019)

6
(4.1)

5
(12.8)

4.230
(0.040)@

Min. level of liquidity (e.g., min. current
ratio, coverage ratio, or working capital).

40
(27.2)

16
(41.0)

2.795
(0.094)

4
(2.7)

5
(12.8)

6.828
(0.009)@

Types of investments or capital
expenditures the firm can make.

22
(15.0)

9 (23.1)

1.460
(0.227)

5
(3.4)

2
(5.1)

0.254
(0.614)@

Loan Requirements (Positive Covenants)

Loan Restrictions (Negative Covenants)

Note: Chi-Square tests are based on the 2 x 2 contingency tables, with two classes of firms (Private and Public)
and two responses ( a check mark or no check mark) for the existence of respective covenant. For brevity, only the
cell counts (percentages) of firms responding with a check mark or “yes” are furnished in the table.
@ indicates that 25 percent or more of expected counts have values less than 5.
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Table II
Banks’ Loan Requirements and Restrictive Covenants – Private Firms
Question: Banks and creditors typically require protection for their loans in several ways. Please indicate (with “X”) the
conditions/restrictions relating to bank loans and loans from other sources that the firm has utilized.
Cell values are the Number (Percentage)
of firms within the respective class (By
Ownership or By Firm Size) indicating
the existence of the covenant in question.

By Ownership
Family
Owned

By Firm Size

(n = 98)

Closely/W
idely
Owned
(n = 50)

Sales
<=
$25 m
(n = 103)

Chi-Sq.
(p-val.)

Furnishing financial statements: inc.
statement, bal. sheet, and cash flows.

93
(94.9)

49
(98.0)

0.819
(0.366)

97

Periodic statements of accounts
receivable and inventory.

36
(36.7)

22
(44.0)

0.733
(0.392)

Personal guarantees from major
stockholders, officers, or directors.

53
(54.1)

25
(50.0)

Collateral of property and/or equipment.

60
(61.2)

33
(66.0)

Sales
> $25 m
(n = 45)

Chi-Sq.
(p-val.)

(94.1)

44
(97.8)

0.902
(0.342)

40

(38.8)

18 (40.0)

0.018
(0.894)

0.221
(0.638)

62

(60.2)

16
(35.6)

7.627
(0.006)

0.323
(0.570)

68

(66.0)

25
(55.6)

1.468
(0.226)

1.116
(0.291)

22

(21.4)

Loan Requirements (Positive Covenants)

Life insurance covering the firm’s key
personnel or major stockholders.

23
(23.5)

Requiring representation on the
company’s board of directors.

0
(0.0)

8

Seeking equity ownership in the firm.
0

(0.0)

(16.0)

9

(20.0)

0.035
(0.852)

0
(0.0)

N/A

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N/A

0
(0.0)

N/A

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N/A

0.399
(0.527)

11
(10.7)

9
(20.0)

2.328
(0.127)

3
(6.0)

0.009
(0.977)

6
(5.8)

3
(6.7)

0.039
(0.844)

Loan Restrictions (Negative Covenants)
Max. dividend payments (e.g., max.
payout ratio) to stockholders.
Max. salary/other compensation to the
officers and directors..

12
(12.2)
6

(6.1)

8

(16.0)

Max. debt level (e.g., maximum debt level
as a percentage of total capital).

19
(19.4)

14
(28.0)

1.417
(0.234)

22

(21.4)

11
(24.4)

0.172
(0.678)

Min. level of liquidity (e.g., min. current
ratio, coverage ratio, or working capital).

24
(24.5)

16
(32.0)

0.947
(0.330)

22

(21.4)

18
(40.0)

5.513
(0.019)

Types of investments or capital
expenditures the firm can make.

16
(16.3)

6
(12.0)

0.490
(0.484)

14

(13.5)

8

(17.8)

0.434
(0.510)

Note: Chi-Square tests are based on the 2 x 2 contingency tables, with two classes of firms in each case (By
Ownership or By Firm Size) and two responses (a check or no check mark) for the existence of respective
covenant. For brevity, only the cell counts (percentages) of firms responding with a check mark or “yes” are
furnished in the table. @ indicates that 25 percent or more of expected counts have values less than 5.
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Table III
Banks’ Loan Requirements and Restrictive Covenants – Private Firms
Question: Banks and creditors typically require protection for their loans in several ways. Please indicate (with “X”) the
conditions/restrictions relating to bank loans and loans from other sources that the firm has utilized.
Cell values are the Number (Percentage) of firms within
the respective class (By Debt Leverage) indicating the
existence of the covenant in question.

Loan Requirements

By Debt Leverage
Debt Ratio
1 -10 %
(n=42)

Debt Ratio
11 - 25 %
(n=41)

Debt Ratio
> 25 %
(n=59)

Chi-Sq
(p-value)

Cell values are the number (percentage) of firms.

Furnishing financial statements: income statement,
balance sheet, and cash flows.

39
(92.9)

39
(95.1)

57
(96.6)

0.738
(0.691)

Periodic statements of accounts receivable and inventory.

12
(28.6)

17
(41.5)

28
(47.5)

3.684
(0.159)

Personal guarantees from the firm’s major stockholders,
officers, or directors.

16
(38.1)

20
(48.8)

37
(62.7)

6.111
(0.047)

Collateral of property and/or equipment.

21
(50.0)

24
(58.5)

45
(76.3)

7.878
(0.019)

Life insurance covering the key personnel or major
stockholders of the firm.

4
(9.5)

10
(24.4)

15
(25.4)

4.378
(0.112)

Requiring representation on the company’s board of
directors.

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N.A.

Seeking equity ownership in the firm.

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N.A.

Loan Restrictions / Covenants

Cell values are the number (percentage) of firms.

Maximum dividend payments (e.g., max. payout ratio) to
common stockholders.

4
(9.5)

4
(9.8)

11
(18.6)

2.414
(0.299)

Maximum salary/other compensation to the company’s
officers and directors..

0
(0.00)

3
(7.3)

5
(8.5)

3.622
(0.164)

Maximum debt level (e.g., maximum debt level as a
percentage of total capital).

3
(7.1)

9
(21.9)

20
(33.9)

10.072
(0.006)

Min. level of liquidity (e.g., min. current ratio, coverage
ratio, or working capital).

5
(11.9)

10
(24.4)

24
(40.7)

10.469
(0.005)

Types of investments or capital expenditures that the
company can make.

2
(4.8)

4
(9.8)

15
(25.4)

9.470
(0.009)

Note: Chi-Square tests are based on the 3 x 2 contingency tables, with three classes of firms (By Debt Leverage)
and two responses (a check or no check mark) for the existence of respective covenant. For brevity, only the cell
counts (percentages) of firms responding with a check mark or “yes” are furnished in the table. @ indicates that
25 percent or more of expected counts have values less than 5.
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Table IV
Banks’ Loan Requirements and Restrictive Covenants – Private Firms
Question: Banks and creditors typically require protection for their loans in several ways. Please indicate (with “X”) the
conditions/restrictions relating to bank loans and loans from other sources that the firm has utilized.
Cell values are the Number (Percentage)
of firms within the respective class (By
Debt Cost or By Debt Security) indicating
the existence of the covenant in question.

By Debt Cost

By Debt Security

<= Prime
Rate
(n = 85)

> Prime
Rate
(n = 64)

Chi-Sq.
(p-val.)

Unsecured
Debt
(n = 45)

Secured
Debt
(n = 94)

Chi-Sq.
(p-val.)

Furnishing financial statements: inc.
statement, bal. sheet, and cash flows.

79 (92.9)

63 (98.4)

2.463
(0.117)

42
(93.3)

90
(95.7)

0.370
(0.543)

Periodic statements of accounts
receivable and inventory.

30 (35.3)

28 (43.8)

1.098
(0.295)

10
(22.2)

47
(50.0)

9.707
(0.002)

Personal guarantees from major
stockholders, officers, or directors.

25 (29.4)

53 (82.8)

41.738
(<.0001)

13
(28.9)

64
(68.1)

18.922
(<.0001)

43 (50.6)

50 (78.1)

11.802
(0.0006)

16
(35.6)

74
(78.7)

24.845
(<.0001)

13 (15.3)

18
(28.1)

3.648
(0.056)

9
(20.0)

21
(22.3)

0.098
(0.754)

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N/A

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N/A

Loan Requirements (Positive Covenants)

Collateral of property and/or equipment.
Life insurance covering the firm’s key
personnel or major stockholders.
Requiring representation on the
company’s board of directors.
0

(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N/A

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

N/A

Max. dividend payments (e.g., max.
payout ratio) to stockholders.

7

(8.2)

13 (20.3)

4.583
(0.032)

2
(4.4)

17
(18.1)

4.798
(0.029)

Max. salary/other compensation to the
officers and directors..

2

(2.4)

7

4.741
(0.030)@

2
(4.4)

7
(7.4)

0.453
(0.501)@

Max. debt level (e.g., maximum debt level
as a percentage of total capital).

14 (16.5)

19 (29.7)

3.699
(0.054)

6
(13.3)

27
(28.7)

3.981
(0.046)

Min. level of liquidity (e.g., min. current
ratio, coverage ratio, or working capital).

22 (25.9)

18 (28.1)

0.094
(0.760)

8
(17.8)

32
(34.0)

3.928
(0.048)

Types of investments or capital
expenditures the firm can make.

8

14 (21.9)

4.506
(0.034)

3
(6.7)

19
(20.2)

4.192
(0.041)

Seeking equity ownership in the firm.
Loan Restrictions (Negative Covenants)

(9.4)

(10.9)

Note: Chi-Square tests are based on the 2 x 2 contingency tables, with two classes of firms in each case (By Cost
or By Debt Security) and two responses (a check or no check mark) for the existence of respective covenant. For
brevity, only the cell counts (percentages) of firms responding with a check mark or “yes” are furnished in the
table. @ indicates that 25 percent or more of expected counts have values less than 5.

71

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 11, Iss. 2
Table V
Regression Analysis : Cross-sectional Variation in Debt Covenants
Model 1
BANKCOV

Model
Dep. Variable

Model 2
BANKCOV

Model 3
BANKCOV1

Explanatory
Variables

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

INTERCEPT

-3.086

1.365**

-4.084

1.482***

-3.463

1.163***

DEBTRAT

0.505

0.124***

0.652

0.146***

0.452

0.115***

DEBTMAT

0.128

0.205

0.126

0.215

0.139

0.168

SECDEBT

0.532

0.348

0.643

0.370*

0.538

0.291*

DEBTCOST

0.500

0.199**

0.568

0.220***

0.328

0.173*

TRCREDIT

0.218

0.105**

0.188

0.112*

0.147

0.088*

INSOWN

0.153

0.103

0.151

0.109

0.087

0.086

CEOEXP

0.314

0.159**

0.302

0.173*

0.233

0.136*

PAYOUT

-0.101

0.119

-0.093

0.131

-0.018

0.103

COMPAGE

0.129

0.149

0.151

0.157

0.093

0.123

---

---

0.057

0.195

0.004

0.153

1.177

0.478**

1.117

0.557**

0.875

0.4377**

SIZE
FIRMTYPE
# of Observations
Adj. R-Square
Var. Infl. Factors

Statistical Significance:
148
0.2407
All < 2

*** 1 percent;

** 5 percent;
136
0.2691
All <= 2

* 10 percent
136
0.2115
All <= 2

Variable

Measurement

DEBTRAT

2 = 1-10%;

DEBTMAT

Debt Maturity: 1 = Short-term; 2 = Medium-term; 3 = Long-term.

SECDEBT

Whether majority of the firm’s debt is Unsecured (= 1) or Secured (= 2).

DEBTCOST

1 = Below Prime Rate; 2 = At Prime Rate; 3 = Up to 2% over Prime Rate;
4 = Between 2.1 and 5% over Prime Rate; 5 = More than 5% over Prime Rate.

TRCREDIT

Trade credit as a source of finance: 1 = Least important; ..... 5 = Most important.

INSOWN

Stock ownership by insiders: 1 = 0%;
5 = 51-75%;
6 = >75%

CEOEXP

CEO’s tenure (number of years) in that position.

PAYOUT

Dividend payout ratio: 1 = 0%;
5 = 51-75%;
6 = >75%

COMPAGE

Age of the company – the number of years of operation: 1 = 1-5 yrs; 2 = 6-10 yrs; 3 =
11-25 yrs; 4 = 26-50 yrs; 5 = 51-75 yrs; 6 = > 75 yrs.

3 = 11-25%;

4 = 26-50%;

5 = 51-75%;

2 = 1-10%;

2 = 1-10%;

3 = 11-25%;

3 = 11-25%;

2 = $51-100 m;

6 = >75%

4 = 26-50%;

4 = 26-50%;

SIZE

Company Sales: 1 = $50 m or less;
$500 m - $1 b; 5 = > 1 b.

3 = $101 - $500 m;

FIRMTYPE

Dummy variable; 1 = If the company is publicly-owned; 0 otherwise.

4=
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